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Abstract. This paper presents a role-involved conditional purpose-based
access control (RCPBAC) model, where a purpose is defined as the inten-
sion of data accesses or usages. RCPBAC allows users using some data
for certain purpose with conditions. The structure of RCPBAC model
is defined and investigated. An algorithm is developed to achieve the
compliance computation between access purposes (related to data ac-
cess) and intended purposes (related to data objects) and is illustrated
with role-based access control (RBAC) to support RCPBAC. According
to this model, more information from data providers can be extracted
while at the same time assuring privacy that maximizes the usability of
consumers’ data. It extends traditional access control models to a fur-
ther coverage of privacy preserving in data mining environment as RBAC
is one of the most popular approach towards access control to achieve
database security and available in database management systems. The
structure helps enterprises to circulate clear privacy promise, to collect
and manage user preferences and consent.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays privacy becomes a major concern for both consumers and enterprises
and thus privacy preservation is a challenging problem. Enterprises collect cus-
tomer’s private information along with other attributes during any kind of mar-
keting activities. It is a natural expectation that the enterprise will use this
information for various purposes, this leading to concerns that the personal data
may be misused. As individuals are more concerned about their privacy, they are
becoming more reluctant to carry out their businesses and transactions online,
and many organizations are losing a considerable amount of potential profits [9].
Therefore without a clear compromising between individuals and enterprises,
data quality and data privacy cannot be achieved and so many organizations are
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seriously thinking about privacy issues of consumers. By demonstrating good
privacy practices, many businesses are now trying to build up solid trust to
customers, thereby attracting more customers [4]. Considering the privacy of
customers, enterprise has to develop a secure privacy policy to remove the fear
of customers. Thus in an internal management system, a reliable, efficient, ef-
fective and secure privacy policy should be established depending on customer’s
requirements.
One of the most popular approach for protecting private information is the
access control model. Access control is the process of limiting access to the re-
sources of a system only to authorized users, programs, processes, or other sys-
tems [23]. The traditional access control model focus on which user is performing
which action on which data objects and completely ignores which purpose data
will be used. It also overlook to take consent from customers of using their pri-
vate data. Thus it can be said that personal information can be collected, stored
and used without any consent of customers that make them fear of breaching
privacy. So the access control model should be developed in such a way that sat-
isfy customer requirement as well as specify which purpose data will be used for.
Observing the lack of adequate privacy protecting systems, Byun et al. [7] pro-
posed a privacy preserving access control model for relational databases based
on the notion of purpose following an idea of Agrawal [1].They argue that the
notion of purpose must play a major role in access control models and that an
appropriate metadata model must be developed to support such privacy centric
access control models in order to protect data privacy. An approach is developed
that is based on intended purposes and access purposes corresponding to the
data object and the data access respectively which makes access control clearer.
Usually, during the data collection procedure customers are informed about the
purposes of enterprises. Customers then decide whether their information could
be used or not for a certain purpose. That means data providers are given an
option of using their data with certain purposes. If an individual mentions that
his/her data could not be used for a certain purpose, then his/her information
is not accessible for the purpose. Generally data providers are reluctant to use
any part of their information for any purposes and so there is a possibility of
losing information. But more information can be extracted from data providers
by providing more options of using their information. An intended purpose is
divided (IP) into two parts: Allowed Intended Purposes (AIP) (explicitly allows
to access the data for the particular purpose) and Prohibited Intended Purpose
(PIP) (data access for particular purposes are never allowed). In our previous
work [11], we included another term conditional intended purpose (CIP) (Con-
ditionally allows to access the data for the particular purpose) to extract in-
formation from PIP, which referred to conditional purpose-based access control
(CPBAC) model. The key characteristics of CPBAC model was that it allows
users using some data with certain conditions and multiple purposes can be asso-
ciated with each data element. Our previous work exploited query modification
techniques to support data access control based on the conditional purpose in-
formation. However, RBAC is one of the most popular approach towards access
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control to achieve database security and available in many database management
system, need to address it in CPBAC. To implement this, we need to expand
CPBAC model with the conventional well-known RBAC. Such an extension of
CPBAC with roles which we refer to role-involved conditional purpose-based ac-
cess control (RCPBAC) model is presented in this paper. Both access purposes
and intended purposes are specified with respect to a hierarchical structure that
organizes a set of purposes for a given enterprise.
Role based access control (RBAC) proposed by Sandhu et al. [18] has been
widely used in database system management and operating system products
because of its significant impact on access control systems. RBAC is described
in terms of individual users being associated with roles as well as roles being
associated with permissions (each permission is a pair of objects and operations).
As such, a role is associated with users and permissions. A user in this model is
a human being and a role is a job function or job title within the organization
associated with its authority and responsibility. RBAC model also includes a role
hierarchy, a partial order defining a relationship between roles, to facilitate the
administration tasks. In this paper we utilize RBAC which supports conditional
purpose into our model. Thus RCPBAC model has the following features:
– It satisfies data providers requirements and allows users using data with con-
ditions. The data provider express his/her own privacy preferences through
setting intended purpose with three levels (AIP, CIP and PIP), while the
data owner is responsible for working out the policies for authorization of
access purpose.
– Its algorithm utilizes RBAC to achieve the compliance computation between
access purpose and intended purpose.
– It extracts more information from data providers by providing more possible
options of using their information assuring privacy of private information
that maximizes the usability of data.
– It determines the compliance computation between access purpose and in-
tended purpose. Intended purposes are associated with the requested data
objects during the access decision to the well-designed hierarchy of private
metadata.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. We present a brief overview
of privacy related technologies in Section 2. Since purpose is used as the basis
of access control, a brief description of the notion of purpose is described in
Section 3. In Section 4 we present comprehensive descriptions of our proposed
access control model with roles. Access decision of the proposed RCPBAC model
is illustrated in Section 5. Concluding remarks are included in Section 6.
2 Related Work
This work is related to several topics in the area of privacy preservation in data
mining atmosphere. The most notable technique to protect privacy is the W3C’s
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) that formally specify privacy policy by
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service providers [13]. Byun et al. [7] indicate that P3P does not provide any
functionality to keep promises in the internal privacy practice of enterprise. Thus
it can be said that a striking privacy policy with inadequate enforcement mech-
anism may place the organizations at risk of reputation damage. The concept
of Hippocratic database introduced by Agrawal et al. [1] that amalgamates pri-
vacy protection in relational database system. A Hippocratic database includes
privacy policies and authorizations that associate with each attribute and each
user the usage purpose(s) [3]. Agrawal et al. [1] presented a privacy preserv-
ing database architecture called Strawman which was based the access control
on the notion of purposes, and opened up database-level researchers of privacy
protection technologies. After that, purpose based access control introduced by
Byun et al. [6, 7] and Yang et al. [21], fine grained access control introduced by
Agrawal et al. [2] and Rizvi et al. [15] are widely used access control models
for privacy protection. In IT system the proposed Enterprise Privacy Authoriza-
tion Language (EPAL) of IBM [10] is a language for writing enterprise privacy
policies to run data handling practices.
A lot of works [5, 8, 16, 17, 19] provide many valuable insights for designing a
fine-grained secure data model. In a multilevel relational database system, every
piece of information is classified into a security level, and every user is assigned
a security clearance [7]. LeFevre et al. [12] proposed an approach to enforcing
privacy policy in database setting. This work focus on ensuring limited data
disclosure, based on the premise that data providers have control over who is
allowed to see their personal data and for what purpose. Peng et al. [22] proposed
an approach for privacy protection based on RBAC. The key feature of their
approach is dynamic and they proposed Dynamic purpose-based access control.
This method however works based on subject attribute and system attribute
but does not guarantee to extract more information. Byun et al. [7] present a
comprehensive approach for privacy preserving access control model. In their
access control model multiple purposes to be associated with each data elements
and also support explicit prohibitions. Massacci et al. [14] also mention that
most privacy-aware technologies use purpose as a central concept around which
privacy protection is built.
All of these works proposed different approaches to protect the privacy of
individuals through different models without being considering to extract more
information. Our aim is to preserve privacy of individuals as well as extracting
more information. With this aim, this paper investigated RBAC to extend our
previous work on CPBAC [11]. It has improved in four different ways. First, we
introduce conditional purpose in the intended purpose in addition to explicit
prohibitions that make data providers more flexible to give information. Second,
the enterprise can publish an ideal privacy policy to manage data in a sensitive,
effective and trustworthy way. Third, it reduces the information loss as it shows
that we can extract more information from data providers and fourth it can
easily be implemented in RBAC, where a RBAC model has made a significant
impact on many access control systems.
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3 Purpose, Access Purpose and Intended Purpose
Data is collected for certain purpose. Each data access also serves a certain pur-
pose. Thus a privacy policy should concern which data object is used for which
purposes.
Purpose
Purpose is the most important thing to researchers as it directly shows how ac-
cess to data elements has to be controlled. P3P defines purpose as “the reason(s)
for data collection and use” and specifies a set of purposes [20]. In commercial
surroundings purposes normally have a hierarchical associations among them;
i.e., generalization and specialization relationships. We borrow the purpose def-
inition from [7].
General-Purpose
Admin Purchage Shipping Marketing
Profiling Analysis Direct Third-Party
D-Email D-Phone T-Email T-Postal
Special-Offers Service-Updates
Fig. 1. Purpose Tree
Definition 1 : (Purpose and Purpose Tree): A purpose describes the intentions
for data collection and data access. A set of purposes, denoted as ω, is organized
in a tree structure, referred to as Purpose Tree and denoted as Ω, where each
node represents a purpose in ω and each edge represents a hierarchical relation
between two purposes. Figure 1 is an example of purpose tree. Purposes, de-
pending on their association with objects and subjects, may be called intended
purposes or access purposes respectively.
Definition 2 (Access Purpose): An access purpose is intensions for accessing
data objects, and it must be determined by system when data access is re-
quested. So access purpose specifies the purpose for which a given data element
is accessed.
Definition 3 (Intended Purpose): An intended purpose is the specified usages
for which data objects are collected. That is, purpose associated with data and
thus regulating data accesses as intended purpose. According to our approach
an intended purpose consists of the following three components.
Allowable Intended Purpose (AIP): This means that data providers explicitly
allow accessing the data for a particular purpose. For example data providers
may consider that his/her information can be used for marketing purpose with-
out any further restrictions.
Conditional Intended Purpose (CIP): This means that data providers allow
accessing the data for a particular purpose with some conditions. For example
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data providers may consider that his/her income information can be used for
marketing purpose through generalization.
Prohibited Intended Purpose (PIP): This means that data providers strictly
disallow accessing the data for a particular purpose. For example data providers
may consider that his/her income information cannot be used for marketing
purpose. In that case data provider’s income attribute is strictly prohibited to
use for marketing purpose. Notice that each data element is stored in three
different purposes each of which corresponds to a particular intended purposes.
So an intended purpose IP is a tuple 〈AIP, CIP, PIP 〉, where AIP ⊆ ω,
CIP⊆ ω and PIP⊆ ω are three sets of purposes. The set of purposes implied
by IP, denoted by IP? and the set of conditional purposes, denoted by IP?c are
defined to be AIP↓-CIPl-PIPl and CIP↓ -PIPl respectively, where
R↓, is the set of all nodes that are descendants of nodes in R, including nodes
in R themselves,
R↑, is the set of all nodes that are ancestors of nodes in R, including nodes
in R themselves, and
Rl, is the set of all nodes that are either ancestors or descendants of nodes
in R, that is, Rl=R↑ ∪ R↓.
Definition 4 (Full Access Purpose Compliance): Let Ω be a purpose tree. Let
IP= 〈AIP, CIP, PIP 〉 and AP be an intended purpose and an access purpose
defined over Ω, respectively. AP is said to be compliant with IP according to Ω,
denoted as AP⇐ΩIP, if and only if AP∈ IP
?.
Definition 5 (Conditional Access Purpose Compliance): Let Ω be a purpose
tree. Let IP= 〈AIP,CIP, PIP 〉 and AP be an intended purpose and an access
purpose defined over Ω, respectively. AP is said to be conditionally compliant
with IP according to Ω, denoted as APc⇐ΩIP, if and only if AP∈ IP
?
c .
Example 1 : Suppose IP= 〈{Admin, Direct}, {Third-party}, {D-mail}〉, then
IP? = {Admin, Profiling, Analysis, D-Phone} and IP?c = {Third-party, T-Email,
T-Postal}, where subscript c indicates that customers information can be used
for the purpose with some conditions.
4 Conditional Purpose-based Access Control (CPBAC)
In the CPBAC model data providers are asked three possible options for usage of
each data item. Permissible usage means data providers allow to use of their data,
prohibited means data providers don’t allow to use their data and conditional
permissible usages means data providers conditionally allow to use of their data
item. Consider Table 1 that describes the intended purpose, types of data and
possible data usages. For example, a data provider may select his/her name is
permissible for Admin purpose, address is not permissible for Shipping purpose
but income information is conditionally permissible for Marketing purpose.
That is, data provider does not have any privacy concern over the name when
it is used for the purpose of administration, great concern about privacy of
the address information (and so does not want to disclose address) when it is
used for the purpose of shipping, but his/her income information can be used for
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Table 1. Intended purpose, data type and data usage type
Term Description Example
Intended Purpose Intended usage of data specified by data provider AIP, CIP, PIP
Data item Types of data being collected (i.e. attributes) Name, Age, Income
Data usage Type Types of potential data usage (i.e. purpose) Marketing, Admin
marketing purpose with some conditions. Here the term “conditions” means that
data providers ready to release his/her certain information for certain purpose
by removing his/her name or id or through generalization. This information is
then stored in the database along with the collected data, and access to the data
is tightly governed according to the data provider’s requirements. For using the
term condition data providers feel more comfortable to release their data. Table
2 shows conditional records and intended purposes of a data provider Alice.
The design of intended purposes supports permissive, conditions and prohibitive
Table 2. Conditional records and intended purposes
name age address income
AIP Alice 35 21, West St., TBA, QLD 4350 35000
CIP A 30-40 West St., TBA, QLD 4350 30000-40000
PIP ? ? ? ?
? means data providers are reluctant of any usage of their
data items
privacy policies. This construction allows more squash and flexible policies in
our model. Moreover, by using CIP and PIP, we can assure that data access
for particular purposes are allowed with some conditions or never allowed. Note
that an access decision is made based on the relationship between the access
purpose and the intended purpose of the data. Access is allowed only if the
access purpose is included in the implementation of the intended purpose; in
that case the access purpose is compliant with the intended purpose. The access
is accepted with conditions if the implementation of intended purpose includes
the access purpose with conditions; in this case we say that access purpose
is conditionally complaint with intended purpose. The access is denied if the
implementation of the intended purpose does not include the access purpose, in
this case access purpose is not complaint with the intended purpose.
4.1 Role-involved CPBAC (RCPBAC)
RBAC model is a landmark in the field of access control models and become a
NIST standard [18]. The key concept of RBAC model is role which represents
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certain job function or job title within the organization. The permission of per-
forming certain operations on certain data is assigned to roles instead of to single
users. Users are thus simply authorized to play the appropriate roles, thereby
acquiring the roles authorizations. When the user makes a request, the system
activates specific roles predefined for him/her. Thus he/she gains the permis-
sion of operating directly or indirectly from roles, which considerably simplifies
the authorization management. Because roles represent organizational functions,
an RBAC model can directly support security policies of the organization. In
the recent development of privacy preserving data mining environment many
researchers have been confessed the importance of purpose, but in the RBAC
model purpose is not yet fully investigated. Based on RBAC, CPBAC model
extends mainly in the following aspects.
– The access permission is no longer a 2-tuple 〈Object, Operation〉, but a 3-
tuple 〈Object, Operation, AccessPurpose〉 which is called the access purpose
permission.
– The access purpose permission is assigned to roles and after the purpose
compliance process, only the objects which are purpose compliant or condi-
tionally compliant can be returned to the users.
Role
R
Purpose
Object
IP
IPL
APPA
Operation
User
UA
Fig. 2. RCPBAC Model
In RCPBAC model, the entity User is defined as a human being, a machine, a
process, or an intelligent autonomous agent, etc. The entity Role represents the
working function or working title assigned within the organization according to
different authorities and obligations. Roles are created for the various job func-
tions in an organization and users are assigned roles based on their authority
and qualifications. Users can be easily reassigned from one role to another. Roles
can be granted new permissions as new applications and systems are incorpo-
rated and permission can be revoked from roles as needed. The entity Object
stands for the data which the user requests and can be abstracted as data set.
The entity operation signifies certain action that the user wants to perform on
the object. The entity Purpose represents all the possible access purposes in the
system and IP signifies the intended purposes with three levels (AIP, CIP, PIP)
attached with each data object. Permission is an approval of a particular opera-
tion to be performed on one or more objects. The RCPBAC model is illustrated
in Figure 2. The formalized definition of RCPBAC model is shown as follows:
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Definition 6 (RCPBAC model):
– User, Role, Operation, Object, Purpose represent the set of users, roles, op-
erations, objects and purposes.
– IP={〈aip, cip, pip〉|aip ⊆ ω, cip ⊆ ω, pip ⊆ ω} is the set of object’s intended
purposes, where aip signifies the object’s permitted intended purpose, cip is
the conditionally permitted intended purpose and pip represents the object’s
forbidden intended purposes [11].
– R={r|r ∈ Role} is the set of roles.
– APP={〈o, opt, ap〉|o ∈ Object, opt ∈ Operation, ap ∈ Purpose} is the set of
access purpose permissions.
– IPL={〈o, ip〉|o ∈ Object, ip ∈ IP} represents the set of data objects and
their predefined intended purpose.
– RH ⊆ Role×Role is a partial order on roles, called the inheritance relation-
ship among roles. We also define a partial order ≥ which is the transitive
closure of RH. For example, r1 ≤ r2 means r1 inherits all permissions of
r2. Figure 3 is an example of role hierarchies of Marketing department for a
hypothetical company.
– PT ⊆ Purpose × Purpose is a partial order on purposes (generalization/
specialization) shown in the purpose tree. Figure 1 is an example of purpose
tree.
– User Assignment UA ⊆ User × Role is a many-to-many mapping relation
between users and their assigned roles.
– Access Purpose Permission Assignment APPA ⊆ Role × APP is a many-
to-many mapping relation between roles and access purpose permissions. It
signifies the action that certain role performs on certain object on certain
access purpose.
– Purpose Compliance PC ⊆ APP ./ IPL ia a one-to-one relation between
each access purpose permission and data object as well as its predefined
intended purposes.
Director
E-Marketing Tele-Marketing
E-Analysts Writers T-Analysts Operators
Fig. 3. Example of Role Hierarchies
Now we are at the stage to provide function definitions to facilitate the discussion
of RCPBAC model.
– assigned−role : User → 2
Role, the mapping of a user u onto a set of roles.
Formally,
assigned−role(u) = {r ∈ Role|〈u, r〉 ∈ UA}
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– assigned−access−purpose−permission : Role → 2
APP , the mapping of a
role r onto access purpose permissions. Formally,
assigned−access−purpose−permission(r) = {app ∈ APP |〈app, r〉 ∈ APPA}
– Purpose−binding : Object → IP , the mapping of a data object o onto
intended purposes ip with three levels, which means finding the bound in-
tended purposes of the object.
– Purpose−compliance : AP × IP → {True, Conditionally True, False},
is used to determine the compliance between the access purpose and the
object’s intended purposes [11]. Formally,
Purpose−compliance(ap, ip)=True iff ap ∈ IP
?,
Purpose−compliance(ap, ip)=Conditionally True iff ap ∈ IP
?
c .
In RCPBAC model, the users are required to explicitly state their access pur-
pose(s) when they try to access data. That is, the users present an access pur-
pose for each query they issue. During the access decision process, the system
combines the requested data with its intended purposes according to privacy
metadata and sends the data whose intended purposes are fully compliant or
conditionally compliant with the access purpose to the requester. As the model
respects customers requirement regarding their data usages and also support
RBAC, it prevents private information from disclosure.
4.2 Authorization and Authentication
Access purpose is the reason for accessing a data item and it must be determined
by the system when a data access is requested. There are different possible
methods for determining the access purpose [7]. Among the various possible
techniques to determine access purpose, in this paper we utilize the method
where the users are required to explicitly state their access purposes when they
try to access data. In the RCPBAC model, access purposes are authorized to
users through roles. Users are required to state their access purposes along with
their queries and the system confirms the stated access purposes by ensuring
that the users are indeed allowed to access data for the particular purposes.
Now we formally define access purpose authorization and its authentication.
Definition 7 (Access Purpose Authorization) Let Ω be a purpose tree and ω
be the set of purposes in Ω. Also let R be the set of roles defined in a system.
An access purpose is authorized to a specific set of users by a pair 〈ap, r〉, where
ap is a access purpose in ω and r is a role defined over R.
Usually in the typical situation, roles and access purpose are organized in a
hierarchical structure. All users authorized for a role ri are also authorized for
any role rj where ri ≥ rj . Thus, activating a role ri automatically activates all
roles rj , such that ri ≥ rj . Similarly, authorizing an access purpose ap for a role
ri implies that the users belonging to ri (or the users belonging to rj , where
ri ≥ rj) are authorized to access data with ap as well as all the descendants
of ap in the purpose tree. The access purpose authentication definition below
confines the implications of access purpose authorizations.
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Definition 8 (Access Purpose Authentication): Let Ω be a purpose tree, ω be
the set of purposes in Ω and R be the set of roles defined in a system. Suppose
that an access purpose ap and a role ri activated by a user u. We say that ap is
legitimate for u under ri if there exists an access purpose authorization 〈apl, ri〉,
where apl in ω and ri is a role defined over R such that ap ∈ Descendants (apl)
and the users belongs to role ri (or any descendants role of ri.)
Consider the purpose tree in Figure 1 and the role hierarchies of Marketing
department for a hypothetical company in Figure 3. Suppose that access purpose
“Service-Updates” are assigned to the “E-Marketing” role. Then the users who
activate the role “E-Marketing” (or the two descendants role) can access data
for the purpose of “Service-Updates”.
Table 3. Intended purposes table
Sl−No. Table−ID Table−Name Cus−ID Attr−Name Intended−Purpose
1 1 Customer−info 22 Customer−Name 〈{General}, {Admin},
{Shipping}〉
2 1 Customer−info 25 Income 〈{Marketing}, {Admin},
{Shipping}〉
3 1 Customer−info 52 Address 〈{Shipping}, {Admin},
{Marketing}〉
By access purpose authorization and authentication, users get access purpose
permission from access control engine. Now it is necessary to check whether
users access purpose is fully or conditionally compliant with data’s intended
purpose for access decision. In the following Section we discuss the compliance
computation for access decision.
5 Access Decision
In our model customers are given three more possible options of using their
data. These make them comfortable to release their data fully or conditionally
and the private information will be protected. After data are collected, intended
purposes with three different levels will be associated with data. As intended
purpose is assigned to every data element, an intended purposes table (IPT) is
formed. Consider a typical IPT table in Table 3 which consists of six columns,
where Sl−No is the serial number, Table−ID is the identification of the original
table, Cus−ID is the hidden attribute which is added when tables are created,
Table−Name is the name of the table in the database and Attr−Name is the
attribute name in the table. Thus the storage of intended purposes and data
are separated. Data providers (customers) are able to control the release of their
data by adding privacy levels into the IPT which will not affect data in the
database. After authorizing access purpose, users get access purpose permission
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Table 4. Compliance computation and access decision algorithm
Comp−Check1 (ap, 〈AIP, PIP 〉)
/? This function is required for access decision ?/
1. if ap ∈ PIP l then
2. return False;
3. else if ap ∈ AIP ↓ then
4. return True;
5. end if
Comp−Check2 (ap, 〈CIP, PIP 〉)
1. if ap ∈ PIP l then
2. return False;
3. else if ap ∈ CIP ↓ then
4. return True;
5. end if
Access Decision (ap, Object O)
/? IPT means intended purpose table ?/
1. For each tuple of IPT where Sl−No.= i(i = 1 to n)
2. c−id=
∏
Cus
−
ID
(σSl
−
No.=i(IPT))
3. attr=
∏
Attr
−
Name
(σSl
−
No.=i(IPT))
4. if O=
∏
Table
−
Name
(σSl
−
No.=i (IPT)),
attr ∈ {A|A is one of O’s attributes}
and c−id∈
∏
O.Cus
−
ID
(O)
5. ip=
∏
Intended
−
Purpose
(σSl
−
No.=i(IPT))
6. if (Comp−Check1 (ap, 〈AIP, PIP 〉)= False)
7. O←
∏
attr1,attr2,...,attrn=null
(σO.Cus
−
ID=c
−
id(O))
8. else if Comp−Check2 (ap, 〈CIP, PIP 〉)= False
9. O←
∏
attr1,attr2,...,attrn=null
(σO.Cus
−
ID=c
−
id(O))
10. return O
from access control engine. The access control engine needs a match process to
finish the compliance computation fully or conditionally between access purposes
and intended purposes. If the requester’s access purpose is fully compliant with
the intended purposes of requested data, the engine will release full data to the
requester. On the other hand, if the access purpose is conditionally compliant, the
engine will release conditional data to the requester, otherwise returned data will
be null. Thus in this model the search engine needs to evaluate two compliance
checks, the first one is for fully compliance and the second one is for conditionally
compliance. The compliance computation and the access decision algorithm of
the model is illustrated in Table 4. Method Comp−Check returns the result
of the purpose compliance check (fully or conditionally) for the given intended
purpose with three levels as described in Section 4. Method Access Decision is
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based on the Comp−Check and the Intended−Purpose of a particular attribute
in the IPT table.
6 Conclusion
Purposes play a significant role in the field of database management system
privacy preserving techniques. In this paper we presented a CPBAC and injected
it with RBAC which we referred to RCPBAC model that enables enterprise
to operate as a reliable keeper of their customers data. The basic concepts of
the proposed model is discussed and it has shown the possibility to extract
more information from customers by providing a secure privacy policy. We also
analyzed an algorithm to achieve the compliance check between access purpose
and intended purposes. The effect of the proposed access control can be useful
for internal access control within an organization as well as information sharing
between organizations as many systems are already using RBAC mechanisms for
the management of access permission. This technique can be used by enterprises
to enforce the privacy promises they make and to enable their customers to
maintain control over their data.
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